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MAJOR COURT DECISIONS, 2009
M2Z Networks, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 558 F.3d
554 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") properly
denied M2Z Networks, Inc.'s ("M2Z") application for a nationwide, 15-year
exclusive license for the 2155-2175 MHz spectrum and its petition for forbear-
ance of applicable rules on the license application in In re Applications for Li-
cense and Authority to Operate in the 2155-2175 MHz Band ("Order").
Holding: The court both affirmed the FCC's dismissal of M2Z's license ap-
plication and affirmed the FCC's denial of M2Z's petition for forbearance.
History: On May 2, 2006, M2Z filed an application with the FCC for a li-
cense to the entire AWS-3 spectrum band. The AWS-3 (advanced wireless
services) band consists of 130 MHz of spectrum designated for providing wire-
less Internet access and other voice and high-speed data services. M2Z's
plan-which it claimed necessitated an exclusive, nationwide license-was to
deliver basic wireless broadband access to most of the country free of charge.
In addition to the license application, M2Z petitioned the FCC for forbearance
of any rule or regulation that might impede the grant of the application. On
August 31, 2007, after inviting both third-party petitions to deny M2Z's appli-
cation and additional license applications for the AWS-3 band, the FCC dis-
missed all of the applications along with M2Z's petition for forbearance on the
basis that public comment should be heard before the assigning of licenses.
Discussion: In reviewing whether the FCC was reasonable in denying
M2Z's request for forbearance, the district court set out the standard for the
procedural advantage. According to the court, the FCC's forbearance from ap-
plying a provision or regulation required that the forbearance be consistent
with the public interest; M2Z's petition had conflated the issue by instead ar-
guing that its AWS-3 license application was in the public interest. Consider-
ing whether to forbear from certain rules and considering whether to grant li-
cense applications, the Court explained, require different determinations, and
one does not simply imply the other, as M2Z had argued. The Court continued,
stating that the denial of applications for purposes of seeking public comment,
and the consequent dismissal of M2Z's petition for forbearance, were in the
public interest, as a more complete record of filings was required to allow the
FCC to consider all relevant factors in licensing.
M2Z further contended that the FCC's cursory discussion of whether for-
bearance would promote competitive market conditions conflicted with 47
U.S.C. § 160(b), which requires a more thorough analysis. However, the Court
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disagreed, supporting the FCC's 160(b) analysis as statutorily adequate. Next,
M2Z claimed the FCC had not carried its burden under 47 U.S.C. § 157, which
requires the opposition to potential licenses that provide new technology to
carry the burden of proving that the proposed license is inconsistent with the
public interest. Distinguishing between situations in which the FCC makes a
public interest determination and situations in which the FCC weighs evidence
presented by third parties in the light of the public interest, the Court clarified
the responsibilities delegated by § 157. In the former instance, the Court said,
the FCC cannot have the burden of such proof shifted against it, and in the lat-
ter, the third party carries the burden even though the FCC weighs the third-
party evidence.
The court also rejected M2Z's last argument that the FCC failed to address
all of M2Z's public interest evidence. M2Z claimed that the FCC was required
to make a public finding on all evidence because 47 U.S.C. § 309 requires such
findings when a competitive auction format is not used. The Court disagreed,
finding no requirement that the FCC, in such a determination, address all evi-
dence and instead found the FCC's more limited address of the evidence was
sufficient. Describing M2Z's arguments as creative but lacking "serious legal
merit," the Court affirmed the FCC Order dismissing M2Z's license applica-
tion and petition for forbearance in all respects.
Summarized Alejandro Valencia
National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Federal
Communication Commission, 555 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
Issue: Whether the 2007 Order adopted by the Federal Communications
Commission ("Commission" or "FCC") violates the First Amendment to the
Constitution, or is arbitrary in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act,
or both.
Holding: Due to the fact that in the 2007 Order the Commission returned to
a limited opt-in consent requirement in response to the increasing activity of
data brokers, and because it gave sufficient reasons for singling out the rela-
tionships between carriers and third-party marketing partners, the court held
that the Commission provided a reasoned analysis required when making its
determination.
History: According to § 222(h)(1) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
("the 1996 Act"), "customer proprietary network information" includes infor-
mation relating to the "quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, lo-
cation and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any
customer of a telecommunications carrier." More generally, this information
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encompasses customers' individual calling plans and special features, the pric-
ing and terms of their contracts for those services, as well as specifics about
who they call and when. Carriers use "customer information" in a variety of
ways. Some carriers may use the information in order to market specific ser-
vices or upgrades to their existing customers, while other carriers, specifically
smaller ones and new market entrants, enter into agreements with joint ventur-
ers or independent contractors to conduct targeted marketing.
In its 1998 Order, the Commission interpreted § 222 as establishing two
categories of uses of customer information. First, uses to which customers im-
plicitly consent simply by subscribing to a carrier's service. Second, uses that
the carrier would have to obtain express customer approval. Additionally, in
order to define implicit customer approval, the Commission adopted the "total
service approach," which distinguished local telephone service, interexchange
(primarily long distance calling service), and commercial mobile radio services
(primarily mobile or cellular phone service) from each other. The 1998 Order
revealed that carriers could in fact infer customer approval within the confines
of existing service and that implicit approval extended to customer information
sharing with carriers' affiliates who provide one another service type within
the existing service relationship between the customer and carrier. However,
the Commission decided that if carriers wished to use or disclose customer
information outside of the existing relationship that the customer had to con-
sent affirmatively and explicitly in advance.
In U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, the court of appeals held that the Commission's
1998 Order consisted of an unconstitutional restriction on the carriers' First
Amendment right to speak to their customers. The court went on to explain
that the Commission failed to show "that an opt-in strategy would not suffi-
ciently protect consumer privacy." In response to this decision, the Commis-
sion initiated a new rulemaking proceeding and issued its 2002 Order that
modified its regulations. The 2002 Order only required opt-out approval for
sharing of customer information between carriers and its affiliates for commu-
nications-related purposes. Furthermore, the 2002 Order permitted carriers to
share customer information with joint venture partners or independent contrac-
tors for marketing communications-related services. However, the Commission
identified that these third parties were not eligible as "carriers" under the 1996
Act and, as a result, were not subject to the confidentiality requirements set
forth in § 222. Consequently, the Commission ordered carriers and their joint
venture partners or independent contractors to enter into confidentiality agree-
ments to safeguard customer information, in addition to the opt-out notices
sent to customers. No challenges were filed against the 2002 Order.
In 2005, the Electronic Privacy Information Center petitioned for further
rulemaking to modify the Commission's customer information sharing rules.
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Specifically, the petition remarked upon the increasing number of "data bro-
kers," which are organizations that sell private information about individuals
online, and expressed grave concern about how simply these organizations are
able to attain information from carriers and other entities. In response to these
concerns, the Commission commenced a new rulemaking proceeding, received
comments, and issued its 2007 Order.
Two months prior to the adoption of the 2007 Order, Congress passed the
Telephone Privacy and Protection Act of 2006. This statute imposed criminal
consequences for pretexting, unauthorized access to consumer accounts online,
selling or transferring customer information, and knowing purchase or receipt
of fraudulently obtained customer information.
In the 2007 Order, the Commission required carriers to "obtain opt-in con-
sent from a customer before disclosing that customer's [information] to a car-
rier's joint venture partner or independent contractor for the purpose of market-
ing communications-related services to that customer." During the rulemaking
process, the Commission learned that consumers were less agreeable to the
sharing of their private information with third parties without their express
prior authorization. Therefore, it concluded that before carriers could share
customer information with joint venture partners or independent contractors,
the customers had to consent expressly to such sharing.
Discussion: Petitioners question that if the First Amendment did not bar
Congress from requiring carriers to obtain their customers' consent, how
would the First Amendment bar the Commission from implementing § 222 by
requiring customer consent? In response, petitioners aver that "both the First
Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act ... require that the Com-
mission . ..support its assertions with evidence before it may restrict the
communication of truthful, lawfully obtained information between carriers and
their marketing partners, and the ways that carriers may communicate with
their existing customers." Essentially, they argue that the opt-in requirement is
more restrictive than the opt-out system that it replaced.
The court notes that in some First Amendment cases the Supreme Court
demanded an evidentiary showing in support of a state's law, while in others
the Supreme Court has found "various unprovable assumptions" sufficient to
support the constitutionality of state and federal laws regulating business.
However, because petitioners concede the constitutionality of § 222, they also
concede at least two factual predicates underlying the statute and the 2007 Or-
der: First, the government has a substantial interest in protecting the privacy of
customer information, and second, requiring customer approval advances that
interest. The test presented by the court for the regulation of commercial
speech is set forth in Central Hudson: the speech must " at least concern lawful
activity and not be misleading"; the "governmental interest [must be] substan-
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tial"; the regulation must "directly advance[] the governmental interest as-
serted"; and the regulation must not be "more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest."
First, the court examines whether there is a "substantial government inter-
est." It determined, as the Tenth Circuit thought in U.S. West, that the interest
in protecting the privacy of customer privacy is confined to preventing embar-
rassment. The court explains that privacy deals with determining for oneself
when, how and to whom personal information will be disclosed to others.
Second, the court examines whether the 2007 Order "directly advances" the
identified governmental interest. The fact that petitioners agree that § 222
complies with the First Amendment essentially resolves the issue. According
to the court, the privacy of customer information cannot be preserved unless
there are restrictions on the carrier's disclosure of it. Petitioners argue that the
Commission violated the First Amendment by implementing the congressional
requirement with an opt-in system. Petitioners aver that the record does not
identify that joint venturers or independent contractors have disclosed cus-
tomer information to others. However, the court elucidates that this argument
distracts from the fact that carrier's sharing of customer information with joint
venturers or independent contractors without the customer's consent is, in and
of itself, an invasion of customer's privacy, which is the precise harm that the
regulation targets. Accordingly, the Commission reasonably concluded that an
opt-in consent requirement directly and materially advanced the interest in pro-
tecting customer privacy and in ensuring customer control over the informa-
tion.
Last, the court considers the final requirement that restrictions on commer-
cial speech must be "no more broad or no more expansive than necessary to
serve its substantial interest." The only condition that must be demonstrated is
that the regulation be proportionate to the interests sought to be advanced,
which the court concludes the 2007 Order easily meets. The Commission's
opt-in consent scheme presumes that consumers do not want their information
shared unless they expressly indicate otherwise. In contrast, petitioners want an
opt-out scheme, which presumes the opposite. In Trans Union II, this court
held that an opt-out scheme is only "marginally less intrusive" than an opt-in
scheme for First Amendment purposes and so upheld a nearly identical regime
requiring out-in consent for the sharing of customer credit information. The
court notes that here the Commission attentively considered the differences
between the two approaches, and the evidence supports the Commission's de-
cision to prefer opt-in consent. The evidence showed that customers were less
willing to have their information shared with third parties, as opposed to affili-
ated entities, thus the Commission reasonably concluded that customer infor-
mation would be at a greater risk of disclosure once out of the control of the
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carriers and in the hands of the entities not subject to § 222.
With regards to the petitioners' claim under the Administrative Procedure
Act, petitioners argue that the Commission acted arbitrarily when, in light of
the evidence of unauthorized disclosures by carriers, it reversed the policy of
the 2002 Order and imposed greater restrictions on the carriers' sharing of cus-
tomer information with third-party marketing partners. The court explains that
it fails for the same reasons that the petitioners' First Amendment claim was
rejected - substantial evidence supported the Commission's 2007 Order and its
reasoning cannot be faulted
Summarized by Heather Cocce
Verizon California, Inc. v. FCC, 555 F.3d 270 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
Issue: Whether Verizon violated § 222(b) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 by using information obtained from competitors through a Local Service
Request ("LSR") in an attempt to prevent its customers from switching to a
different service provider before the LSR was completed.
Holding: The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit denied Verizon's petition for review of the Federal Communications
Commission's Order in Bright House Networks, LLC v. Verizon Cal., Inc. 467
U.S. 837 (1984) ("Order"). The court held that the FCC's interpretation of §
222(b) of the Telecommunications Act was reasonable and, therefore, affirmed
the FCC's decision that Verizon's use of information gained through a LSR
violated the Act. The FCC had ordered Verizon to cease and desist using the
information for these marketing efforts.
History: In a Local Service Request, a telephone service provider is able to
request that pertinent provider telephone information be transferred from a cus-
tomer's previous service provider to the new provider. In an attempt to retain
defecting customers, Verizon used information obtained through the LSR
process to contact its customers and offer them incentives to stay with Verizon.
Critically, Verizon was contacting customers before the LSR process had been
completed. Three cable companies-Bright House Networks, LLC, Comcast
Corporation, and Time Warner Cable Inc.-filed complaints with the FCC ar-
guing that Verizon's efforts violated the Telecommunications Act's § 222(b),
which prohibits carriers from using the propriety information of other carriers
for marketing purposes. The main point of contention was the interpretation of
the statute's phrase "for purposes of providing any telecommunications ser-
vice," and whether it imposed requirements on both carriers involved in a LSR
transaction and only the carrier providing the information.
In defense of its actions, Verizon urged that § 222(b) only applies to carriers
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submitting a LSR and not a carrier receiving it (this would result in the imposi-
tion of § 222(b) restrictions on the cable companies but not on Verizon). Addi-
tionally, Verizon argued that the standard of review set forth in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, under which a court will defer to the FCC's interpretation as
long as it does not contradict the Act's unambiguous text, should not apply
with full deference because of the First Amendment issues raised by the FCC's
interpretation of the statute.
Holding: In considering the FCC's finding in the Order, however, the court
applied Chevron deference, stating that, despite the "oddities" in the FCC's
justification of its interpretation of § 222(b), the Commission had adequately
justified its decision to limit commercial speech in the interest of neutrality.
The court found that the FCC's interpretation that § 222(b) requirements apply
to both the submitting and receiving parties of a LSR was reasonable because §
222(b) does not explicitly state "which carrier is to provide the telecommunica-
tions service." In affirming the Order, the court rejected Verizon's interpreta-
tion of § 222(b), stating that such an application would lead to an "anomalous
result."
The court held that § 222(b) applies to all three complainants because they
are considered "telecommunications carriers" within the meaning of the Act,
despite Verizon's arguments that Comcast and Bright House should be exempt
because they do not hold themselves out as common carriers. The FCC had
found that because each carrier had (1) self-certified themselves as common
carriers, (2) entered into publicly available interconnection agreements with
Verizon, and (3) obtained a state certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity giving notice of its intent to act as a common carrier, all three companies
could be considered common carriers under the Act. The court held that the
totality of these factors rendered the FCC's decision reasonable. Additionally,
as required by a court reviewing agency actions, the court determined the
Commission's interpretation of § 222(b) was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Summarized by Melissa Wright
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